The Fed's $7.77 Trillion Secret Funding Plan

As the ECB considers stepping up to the plate and acting as the lender of last resort, yesterday's blockbuster Bloomberg article on the US Fed's secret funding program (forced out in the open via a Bloomberg lawsuit) could not be more timely.

Here are a few excerpts:

"The Federal Reserve and the big banks fought for more than two years to keep details of the largest bailout in U.S. history a secret. Now, the rest of the world can see what it was missing.

The Fed didn’t tell anyone which banks were in trouble so deep they required a combined $1.2 trillion on Dec. 5, 2008, their single neediest day..."

"The amount of money the central bank parceled out was surprising even to Gary H. Stern, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis from 1985 to 2009, who says he “wasn’t aware of the magnitude.” It dwarfed the Treasury Department’s better-known $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP. Add up guarantees and lending limits, and the Fed had committed $7.77 trillion as of March 2009 to rescuing the financial system, more than half the value of everything produced in the U.S. that year..."

"The secrecy extended even to members of President George W. Bush’s administration who managed TARP. Top aides to Paulson weren’t privy to Fed lending details during the creation of the program that provided crisis funding to more than 700 banks, say two former senior Treasury officials who requested anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak..."

"TARP and the Fed lending programs went “hand in hand,” says Sherrill Shaffer, a banking professor at the University of Wyoming in Laramie and a former chief economist at the New York Fed. While the TARP money helped insulate the central bank from losses, the Fed’s willingness to supply seemingly unlimited financing to the banks assured they wouldn’t collapse, protecting the Treasury’s TARP investments, he says..."

"On Jan. 14, 2009, six days before the company’s central bank loans peaked, the New York Fed gave CEO Vikram Pandit a report declaring Citigroup’s financial strength to be “superficial,” bolstered largely by its $45 billion of Treasury funds..."

To read the full story, click here

The Italian Opera

First, the Greek tragedy. Now, the Italian opera.

As the global deleveraging crisis continues to wreck havoc on the Eurozone and interest rates for one of its largest economies hits record levels (see chart), it is advisable to understand the multiple dimensions of this financial and economic opera.

In his blog posting yesterday, Nobel Laureate Paul Krugman notes, “…Italy is not a shadow bank; its debt has on average a roughly 7-year maturity, so high interest rates take time to filter into higher debt service. As a matter of arithmetic, this could go on for a while, maybe even a couple of years, without necessarily pushing the country into default.”

However, as Mr. K also notes, “...rates can go even higher; banks can come under pressure; and bank depositors can vote with their feet.” And therein lies the real trouble – a run on the bank, in this case, a sovereign. As the FT noted recently, “The biggest US money market funds cut their exposure to European banks to another record low last month, amid continuing uncertainty over the fate of the region’s debt crisis.”

As money flows away from risky areas and into safe havens like the US dollar denominated assets, stress fractures in the global financial and economic fabric continue to break apart thereby producing a cascading effect upon all and an obsessive focus on who’s next.

Bottom line: This opera won't end until the fat lady sings. Unfortunately, I don't hear her even warming up.

And don’t think the Chinese are so dumb nor so economically secure (you can’t built ghost cities forever) that they will send boatloads of bailout cash to sinking ships around the world. Turandot falls in love only once.

But, hey, none of this really matters to the bottom up boys and girls who are no doubt emboldened by the actions of their leader, Warren Buffet, who went on a spending spree in the third quarter.

Bottoms Up!

Giving the devil his due, the bottom-up crowd has won this round, as earnings results are not disappointing as economists did for the third quarter. Therefore, in light of the recent market action, it seems more than productive to understand the nature of this important (but not dominant) segment of the market.

Most investors are bottom-up oriented. They buy and sell stocks with a passing reference to the sector and style tilt their portfolios produce. Like many sports teams, portfolios are populated with the best ideas. Sectors and styles are a by-product. Individual company earnings results, performance metrics (such as profit margins, growth rates, etc.), and valuation levels determine the buy/sell/hold decisions made. From that comes the action taken.

This situation is largely due to tradition and training: traditional among individual investors, training among the professional crowd (the CFA program, for example). It is what the financial media obsesses on while providing limited, yet sorely needed, education on what constitutes good portfolio management.

As one of the two essential elements that drive stock prices up or down (the other being financial market liquidity), earnings results can dominate the moment, as they appear to have done thus far this month. When good earnings results motivate investors to act positively, the momos (the real power in today’s market) join the party, as they are indifferent to the reasons that drive investors and are far more interested in an excuse to act. As long as money is abundant (financial market liquidity), the upside bias exists. Which brings us back to earnings results.

As long as companies deliver positive earnings results and financial market liquidity remains ample, the bottom-up crew can move markets (aided and abetted by the momos, of course) to a significant degree. Should earnings falter, however, then the dual impact of declining results and diminution of financial market liquidity (in the form of redemptions and withdrawals) can produce a negative feedback loop to the real economy (Soros’ “reflexivity”). Yet, more importantly, within this investing approach lie the seeds of its own destruction.

Bottom-up investing is aided and abetted by ivy tower fantasies about efficient markets, assisted with high-sounding phrases like “price discovery” and “capital asset pricing models”, and supported by economic methodologies that are anchored in traditional metric analyses. Such traditional economic methodologies do, however, come with two significant blind spots: the inability to forecast with any degree of accuracy and consistency (certainly commensurate with a practice that fancies itself as a “science”) and an inability to do global macro analysis particularly well.

The first point is self evident and saturated with historical fact. For example, one need only look at today’s consumer confidence miss to see just how off the mark these “social scientists” can be. The second point was made most evident in the debacle known as the Great Recession. Moreover, the inability to do global macro well also comes with an inability to incorporate contagion’s speed and source (real and/or financial economy).

This is a big part of how the world works in Wall Street. It is the dynamic reality that exists in the surreal world of finance. It is the state of denial that many who play the investing game occupy. And it is why it is so essential to step back and smell the global macro rose, which right now has a decidedly foul odor to it.

But, hey! “Who cares?”, say the bottom-up boys and girls. "Earnings are good and that’s all that matters to me."

Reasons and Excuses:Taking The Financial Media To Task

The financial media is at it again. "Stocks soar today because..."(you fill in the reason). "Stocks plunge tomorrow because"... (you fill in the reason).

What the financial media fails to recognize is that, over the past several decades, the structure of the market has changed. Today's short-term market moves are at the margin and being driven not by rational ivory-tower-pipe-puffing-erudite academics but by momentum chasing lemmings who have copycat methodologies that require they follow the mob.

High correlations and high volatility are market outcomes in this reign of the momos. Yet, from a real world economic perspective, the financial media insists on attributing their actions as rational. They are not. They are, however, rational from a personal perspective: they are animal-spirit driven creatures intent on maintaining a lifestyle they have become accustomed to. Who can blame them? They are simply exploiting the system as it functions today.

Investment Strategy Implications

Investors look for reasons to take action. The agnostic momos look for excuses.

Investors look for fundamental and/or technical analysis reasons to act. The agnostic momos could care less.

Keeping my house in Greenwich is how I first described this syndrome, in which the momos' relative performance vis-a-vis their "competitors" trumps all else. In order for them to keep their house in Greenwich, they must not underperform their "competitors". Hence, the mob rule of the momo lemmings' effect and its effect on the markets.

It, therefore, behooves the financial media to get up to speed and start educating the investing public about how the changed structure of the market has changed how the game is played. Which brings us to this question: Is the financial media's job to educate or to entertain? (I guess the answer to this question can be found every weekday at 6 PM eastern.)

DO Fight The Fed

Today, Wall Street's Professional Investor Class (PIC) waits with bated breath for the Fed to provide words of comfort so that one of Wall Street's revered axioms, "don't fight the Fed", will deliver much needed relief to the beleaguered warriors of finance.

One of characteristic of the PICs that is useful to remember is that they are highly reliant on heuristics - rules of thumb that help frame the world into bite-sized analytical pieces. One of the heuristics that has worked from time immemorial is 'don't fight the Fed". For example, last year, around this time, a well-known hedge fund manager advised investors and traders of this well-worn axiom to great effect and result (stocks rose from the fall of 2010 into the summer of 2011). Unfortunately, while the monetary elixir did work its magic on the PICs (they bought stocks), it had little effect on the real economy.

Never sated, the ever-thirsty PICs are back at the don't-fight-the-Fed troff for another hearty slurp of monetary ease = higher risk asset values. From the PICs and Fed's perspectives, the economic rationale for this view is rather simple: Easy money = an increase in the value of risky assets = a positive wealth effect = increase demand = higher GDP (which then = higher wages, increased hiring, etc, etc). Hence, don't fight the Fed ALWAYS delivers. Or does it? And when it does, is the effect always the same under all conditions? Or are the results a product of the economic and financial times?

It may be a risky thing to go against such a dogma. After all, the four most dangerous words in the investment language is "this time is different". And to assume that more easy money will not produce the above listed outcomes is the speak those very dangerous words. Yet, if one believes we are in times that are truly different, particularly in the post WW II era, then perhaps it's time from some fresh perspectives.

Going against such a well-established dogma of day is also especially dangerous given the changed structure of the market. For, when the momo lemmings (who could care less what the drivers are or what direction the markets are headed, just along as stock prices move) jump on the market trend du jour bandwagon, the wheels get turning rather quickly.

Investment Strategy Implications

If you are going to go against a revered heuristic it is useful to have your own heuristic to counter the revered one. My heuristic is this: in a liquidity trap, the effectiveness of monetary policy is limited, at best. Moreover, monetary ease becomes even more limited when fiscal policy is contradtionary (i.e., expansionary austerity). These global macro forces are strong, pervasive, and global in scope.

So, the PICs may rejoice in what they hear today. And risk assets may rise - for a while. But the global macro forces at work can, and I believe will, overwhelm the monetary elixir the Fed will provide. And the PICs don't do global macro very well. (More on this point in a future blog posting.)

Talking Head Alert

I am headed to Stiletto City (a/k/a foxbusiness.com) where you can watch me attempt to describe how the policy response to the Global Stock Market Panic of 2011 will determine if the experience will be like 1987 or 1929. Segment begins around 1 PM (eastern) and can be viewed at foxbusiness.com.

The (Fed) King's Speech

Lionel Logue: [as George "Berty" is lighting up a cigarette] Please don't do that.
King George VI: I'm sorry?
Lionel Logue: I believe sucking smoke into your lungs will kill you.
King George VI: My physicians say it relaxes the throat.
Lionel Logue: They're idiots.
King George VI: They've all been knighted.
Lionel Logue: Makes it official then.

“We have seen increasing evidence that a self sustaining recovery in consumer and business spending may be taking hold.”
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke
Congressional testimony, March 2011

There are two major issues equity investors are currently struggling with. The first is the obvious one: the price of oil. The second is one that I raised months ago at each and every Market Forecast event (10 of them) that I conducted throughout the US: will the US economy reach what economists call “escape velocity” and achieve a sustainable, private sector-led economic expansion WITHOUT the aid of government stimuli? Apparently, our esteemed Fed chairman has answered that question. Let’s hope he’s right.

Let’s hope that:

• The US consumer is capable of spending beyond his/her means, a fact that becomes that has been made all the more difficult as middle income wages have stagnated for decades, that the ability to borrow is now limited to non revolving (as in autos) credit versus other sources, such as revolving (credit card) and home equity withdrawals (see Monday’s Consumer Credit report for the latest installment of this reality), and that the need to continue to repair their balance sheet (deleverage, a/k/a save more, spend less) is combined with the need to prepare for a world of reduced government support (cuts to Social Security and Medicare, for example) looms on the horizon.
• US based corporations decide it’s time to unleash their nearly $2 trillion cash horde on capex projects in the low growth/high cost US and not in the high growth/low cost emerging markets.
• High growth/low cost emerging market governments allow US based companies in to the detriment of their domestic companies, not to mention their emergent, large, multinational competitors.
• Cut backs at the state and local level don't more than offset a prospective hiring and wage increase binge by US companies.
• The US dollar doesn’t crater to new all-time lows thereby driving up longer-term interest rates.
• The unrest and turmoil in North Africa doesn’t leap frog over the Suez Canal into the oil rich, Western friendly despotic kingdoms of the Middle East thereby driving oil prices to record levels.
• The structure of the markets doesn’t produce a financial crisis courtesy some financially engineered Frankenstein ("It's alive!") product, service, or process that few truly understand.

This partial list of concerns is the tip of the iceberg. The full list is a long one. But that’s what bull markets driven by tons of liquidity and constructive earnings results* are supposed to look past. Or, so it's said.

Investment Strategy Implications

Stock market dogma states that a bull market climbs a wall of worry. However, when that wall has lots of grease on it and given the interconnected, interdependent, rapid transmission nature of our globalized world, any slip can turn into a self-reinforcing downward tumble in a very short period of time.

Hope is not a strategy but in the end it may be what this bull market largely rests on.

* The one truly bright spot, that may have run its course with its cutting, management and technology efficiency benefits. Is there more blood that can be wrung from the cost cutting efficiency stone?

Note: Many of the above points were expressed yesterday when I appeared on foxbusiness.com. To view the interview on my media blog click here.

Beyond the Sound Bite: An Interview Rob Nichols

Continuing our focus on the likely impacts of financial regulatory reform on the financial services industry and the overall economy, we get the perspective from the President and COO of the Financial Services Forum.

While not as well known as some other associations, the Financial Services Forum is "a non-partisan financial and economic policy organization comprising the CEOs of 19 of the largest and most diversified financial services institutions doing business in the United States". Need I say more?

Those interested in hearing the views of this important group from its leader will find this a most productive use of one's time.

Beyond the Sound Bite podcast interviews can be found at BeyondTheSoundBite.blogspot.com
To listen to this interview, click here

A Stock Market Correction Hanging In The Balance

Stock market corrections, such as the one we are currently experiencing, are healthy processes by which excesses generated in the advance can be wrung out and rotational (sector) change can evolve. In the process, new leadership emerges thereby helping to elevate the renewed rally to higher levels. There is, however, another evolutionary factor that investors should be mindful of: a correction that could easily evolve into a transitional phase resulting in a market reversal.

One way this transitional phase can occur is when a market correction is succeeded by a failing rally which then morphs into a distributional range from which more market weakness is developed culminating in a market reversal. I referenced one such version of this in last week’s post (“37.17”). While this process is underway, those in favor of the preceding market trend (in this case, a bullish one) argue for a continuation of the preceding good times. In the process, further distributional market action occurs. And when the market decline begins in earnest, the market believers continue to dismiss the move.

Will this occur in the current market conditions? It is too early to say for certain, but for the moment the benefit of the doubt must be given to the bull case for the following reasons:

The fundamental argument for a resumption of the bull after the correction is anchored in optimistic earnings growth levels (S&P 500 operating earnings of $80 and $88 for 2010 and 2011, respectively) coming to pass AND for average to above average P/E ratios (15 to 18) being applied to such earnings. For both issues to occur, an economic slowdown in the US and Europe coupled with a only modest decline in China’s growth rate is one key ingredient*. A second ingredient is for little to no serious surprises in the geo political realm. This would include any exogenous shocks, such as a massive terrorism act. It would also include governments that are overly fractured due to the consequences of domestic politics (e.g. the US mid term elections).

A third ingredient would be for longer-term interest rates (5 and 10 years) to remain range bound and neither decline nor increase substantially as either move would imply deflation or inflation. Both will likely be most unacceptable to investors – the former for the implications of a collapsing pricing structure for businesses (not to mention the risks to monetary policy, among other risks), the latter for the implications of a higher cost of capital (among other factors, and not excluding the possibility of a stagflationary environment).

A fourth ingredient has to be the unforeseen and unintended consequences emanating from the final financial regulatory reform bill and/or overly aggressive action by the regulators. Since virtually no one can predict how far the financial tentacles reach from financial innovation products and processes into the real economy, this is a substantial unknown that goes far beyond just the financial services industry and must not produce yet another macro financial services industry surprise (that ends up negatively impacting the real economy).

In sum:

• Sustained economic growth (albeit at very low rates in developed economies)
• No geo political or exogenous shocks
• Stable longer-term interest rates
• No unintended consequences from the new regulatory regime

If any of the above four items fail to live up to expectations, the fundamental arguments for a resumption of the bull market must be reexamined.

Investment Strategy Implications

When it comes to stocks, it must be assumed that the old Yogi Berra adage, “It ain’t over ‘til it’s over”, applies. The above four items could deliver and the current market correction will be all she wrote. Markets get in gear again and higher highs are confirmed. However, if any of the above falls short, the fundamental justification for higher stock prices is in jeopardy.

From a market intelligence perspective, until there are clear signs of a market reversal (a Mega Trend reversal being the most significant), it is advisable to operate on the assumption that the correction will be just that – a correction – followed by a resumption of the trend in force. That said, investors are advised to be ever vigilant for signs of market deterioration and the aforementioned items as the fundamental story hangs in the balance. And that goes a long way toward explaining the contradictory and conflicting market action of late.

*China's growth must also evolve to a more demand driven model and away from fixed investment and exports, both of which are unsustainable for China and, importantly, the global growth story. Corporate profitability needs to remain at their current levels, something that appears to be quite achievable.

We’ve Seen This Movie Before

The dramatic news on Friday (re Goldman Sachs) has a more narrow impact (directly on Financials) and a far more limited impact on the broad market as the economic recovery and its sustainability are significantly more important to equity prices overall.

The limited broad market impact would be for Financials to begin to struggle and potentially produce a negative contribution to higher prices. However, the likely offset is a rotation away from Financials and into other sectors where less governmental activism exists. This is similar to what occurred with the Healthcare sector, as the debate became law. Healthcare stocks may have underperformed but the overall bull market remained intact. The same is very likely to occur going forward re Financials and the broad market.

Concerns re an activist government (greater regulation, lower profit margins) appear to be somewhat overblown. The Obama administration's axiom – “Don’t let the perfect be the enemy of the good” – demonstrates both a pragmatic approach to issues and no intention of destroying whole industries and the companies within, the histrionics of the right wing opposition notwithstanding. The price that is being asked to be paid (in the form of greater/tighter/smarter regulation) appears to be a very reasonable one given the economic debacle that succeeded the more laissez-faire approach to regulation.

What may be some concern to investors is the masterful manner in which the Obama administration has finessed their opposition. In a series of events that can only be viewed a classic Clintonian, consider what occurred the past week:

• On Wednesday (April 15, 2010), President Obama meets with congressional leaders at the White House to discuss financial regulatory reform.
• Senate Republican minority leader Mitch McConnell (providing an outstanding example of Pavlovian behavior) steps out of the meeting (fresh from his recent sojourn to the titans of Wall Street) to declare that President Obama is on the wrong side of this issue.
• On Friday, the Securities and Exchange Commission charges Goldman Sachs with investor fraud.

At this point, someone needs to hand Senator McConnell a towel to wipe the egg off his face.

This week, more bank earnings results will be reported, including those from none other than Goldman Sachs (Tuesday, April 20th). The results are sure to further inflame the public outcry re bank bailouts and buttress the efforts of the Obama administration and the Democrats to push through financial regulatory reform.

The consequences of a victory in financial regulatory reform will have repercussions in this fall’s midterm elections. Moreover, it is the manner in which Obama handled the Republicans this time around that is yet to be fully digested by most investors (think Bill Clinton and his famous triangulation strategy). It does appear that the Obama administration (and President Obama, in particular) have relocated their political voice and have combined that with a governing style that needs to better appreciated by investors.

Investment Strategy Implications

Right now, what matters more to equities is the global cyclical recovery. The challenge will be whether the economic handoff (from government spending to sustainable private sector growth) can truly occur. That is a question that still remains to be answered. Despite the solid earnings results of 4Q09 and thus far from 1Q10, it is hard to determine whether growth can be sustained without the life support mechanisms put in place by governments around the world. And the growth in debt, the extraordinary and inventive governmental actions (quantitative easing, for example) and the generous amounts of liquidity cannot go on indefinitely.

The longer-term structural problems (e.g. debt levels, consumer demand in emerging economies, imbalanced domestic growth policies in key emerging economies (notably China), the currency straightjacket on weak economies within the Eurozone, among others) along with the aforementioned Obama’s emergent political skill wait in the wings and may become the rationale for the long overdue market correction. These fault lines are to be monitored closely for signs that they will become the focal point for investors. This is where market intelligence earns it pay*.

In the meantime, the excess liquidity and encouraging cyclical growth remain center stage for most investors. A clear case of the cyclical over the secular. Accordingly, there is little reason for investors to move to the sidelines and adopt anything more than a cautiously bullish position. There will come a time for a more aggressively conservative view. That time does not appear to be now.

*The absence of traditional investors is also a worrisome sign as trading continues to be dominated by the fast money crowd. More on this in a future posting.

Earnings Season Is The Reason…

…not to sell your equity positions. At least not yet.

Based on the fact that a sufficient number of macro economic reports came in above consensus expectations during the first quarter, there is a high probability that 1Q10 earnings results will exceed earnings expectations in the coming weeks. And that appears to be more than enough of a reason for investors to sit tight with their equity holdings for just a touch longer.

Producing its second highest reading since being created one year ago, the Blue Marble Research proprietary Macro Economic Reports Indicator (MERI) registered a +8 for the first quarter of this year. The +8 number is second to the +12 reading for 2Q09, a quarter that resulted in well above consensus earnings reports for that quarter. Since most investors are of the bottom up stripe, waiting for the good earnings news should help restrain same investors from heading for the exits BEFORE the positive data is shared. The most immediate stock market relevance to the earnings reports is what happens to stock prices as the results are published. For those more bearishly inclined, the soon to be reported good news earnings season sets up a potential “buy on the rumor, sell on the news” scenario for stocks. However, on its own, such an occurrence is likely to NOT result in the long anticipated big correction (>10% in the US, >20% in higher beta markets).

Not Enough For The Big Enchilada

For something more substantial to occur to the downside in stocks, something more substantial needs to arrive on the scene to serve as the catalyst that brings into doubt both the sustainability of the bull market AND the economic handoff (from government spending to private sector growth) necessary for a sustainable economic recovery. There are many candidates capable of serving the role of stock market correction catalyst, with the leading prospect being rising long-term US interest rates. In this regard, the 10 year US Treasury rate is the prime suspect for the role.

As I noted in last week’s commentary, a rise in longer-term interest rates would produce a hit to valuation models that would be both direct and immediate. In its most simplistic form: rates up, P/E ratios down. Given the fact that so much of this bull market is anchored in the above average P/E ratio thesis (>15 times earnings, so justified due to low interest rates and low inflation), rising rates hold the potential of blowing a meaningful hole in that view – enough to take stocks prices down for the prescribed market correction amount (>10% in the US, >20% in higher beta markets).

What About Higher Growth Rates?

All fundamental valuation models identify two factors has having the largest impact on the present value of an asset – the discount rate (which includes interest rates) and the growth rate (of future cash flows/earnings). Accordingly, the offset to rising interest rates – rising growth rates – would most likely not occur as immediately as the bulls would argue due to concerns regarding the viability of sustained economic growth, as the aforementioned economic handoff will be brought into question courtesy the implications embedded in higher long-term interest rates. Regardless of what might be speculated re rising long-term rates, the very fact that rates are now on a upward glide path should be more than sufficient to raise the appropriate cautionary views toward equities.

Then there is the technical analysis hit to the market, as the upside move in rates would trigger a plethora of market technicians’ forecast of a major, multi-year head and shoulders bottom – with its measured upside move to 6%. As investors seek to make sense of the rising rate environment, market technicians will do their part in duly noting the message of the market – whatever it may be saying.

Our Old Friend The Shadow Banking System

Another equally important candidate for the catalyst role would be a global version of the Greek fiscal drama currently underway. As the lack of transparency in the sovereign and other debt markets (which I would include US states and other governmental municipalities throughout the world in that mix), just who is on the hook for what remains shrouded in the shadows (as in the shadow banking system). Such as point was noted quite articulately in yesterday’s FT commentary by Ken Rogoff.*

Investment Strategy Implications

To some investors, what I described above could easily be perceived as an attempt to squeeze out a few more basis points from the overvalued, long-in-the-tooth stock market stone. Such thinking may actually turn out to be correct. However, absent a catalyst it is hard to envision what could derail the bulls momentum.

Given the massive amounts of cash still sloshing around the world economy and financial markets, the strong economic health of most businesses, globalization damaged but not broken, and the global growth story still fairly intact, it appears logical that something more substantial will be needed to bring into doubt the bullish case. And that is what market corrections are all about – doubt that what was will resume.

For such doubt to arise, a catalyst is most likely needed to trigger the requisite angst that is the hallmark of a stock market correction. In this commentary, you have the two leading candidates for that role. There are others.

This is not a matter of if but when (and who).

*”Bubbles Lurk in Government Debt”, Financial Times, April 7, 2010.

We (Still) Don't Know What We Don't Know

So, here we are. More than two years into what started out as a credit crisis, one plus year after the Lehman collapse and a question that pertains to the one of the central workings of the equities market cannot be answered.

At last evening's Market Technicians Association Educational Foundation seminar, the question your trusty moderator (that's me) posed to the esteemed panel with its decades of experience was in regards to volume. Specifically, the equity markets' volume as recorded each day for every stock traded. That is, the volume that accompanies the price action that results in the market capitalization of the stock market that results in the market value of every investor's portfolio.

Many market analysts have noted the low volume that has accompanied this bull rally. Some have used this fact as a reason to be more cautious, even bearish. Others have cited that low volume bull rallies have occurred in the past and this one is no different. However, in the past, the volume recorded for equity trades completed were quite accurate and reliable, being recorded on exchanges and reported accordingly. Today, the picture is not quite so clear.

With so much trading occurring in the off the exchanges hidden recesses of dark pools and structured products, I asked my very knowledgeable panel, can any investor rely on the volume figures being generated in this current market to measure the strength of the price action of a stock? The answer received was, "We don't know". Well, if this well connected, highly informed group of individuals doesn't know, you can easily assume that just about no one knows. Do you?

The importance of understanding this issue goes beyond its impact on basic market analysis tools (such as technical analysis) and cuts to the heart of a financial system that is still shrouded in opaqueness.

Transparency remains elusive. Yet, transparency (knowing what investors need to know) is vital to the restoration of a sustained confidence in a system that can be measured. When trades occur in the dark corners of dark pools and other off-exchange structured products, clarity as to what exactly is transpiring becomes the victim and investors seeking to measure the market become the equivalent of a bystander to a drive-by financial shooting.

Investment Strategy Implications

Nothing increases the risk factor of any investment more than the dangers posed by ignorance. Yet, here we are. More than two years into what started out as a credit crisis, one plus year after the Lehman collapse and we still don't have a clear idea of what exactly is transpiring in a central part of the capital markets - equities.

For those who might be tempted to dismiss such concerns I simply point to the two key impacts of changing equity prices: the wealth effect and the cost of capital. Both directly impact the real economy, in the current case in a positive way. Were it not for rising market values, the current government policies designed to rescue the US (and global) economy would be brought into doubt. And doubt, a close cousin of uncertainty, is a bad thing for a fragile economic environment.

Price without volume is an incomplete measure of the strength (or weakness) of a market move. Yet, in the current environment, price is the only metric that can be tracked with clarity. Volume, its indicator of power, cannot.

Two years and running and we still don't know what we don't know.

To further the exploration of what we don't know tomorrow I will describe how hedge fund replication products pose a potential threat to the equity markets.

The 3 Phases of this Bull Market

The stock market rally since early March appears to have three distinct phases to it.

The first phase was the backing off from the economic abyss. The second phase was a bounce to fair value normalcy. The third phase (the one we are in now) is what I would call the return to business as usual phase (or “Recession. What recession?).

From where I sit, the first two phases were justified on many levels. Both phases featured massive amounts of government intervention combined with strong technicals to produce a rally to fair value. The elimination of the tail risk of the Great Depression II was followed by the above consensus macro economic readings (my MERI indicator), which was reinforced by the above consensus earnings results of 2Q09. Stocks rose to a reasonable fair value. So far, so good.

Unfortunately, at this point the seeds of questionable earlier decisions began to bear fruit. (Now, this going to sound very libertarian, so here goes.) Instead of pursuing the necessary cleansing process that all excesses produce, the Obama administration (which includes the US Treasury and the “independent” Federal Reserve) opted for a massive debt transference from the private to the public sector with the hope that time will heal all wounds. Along with this decision to socialize the bad behavior of the private sector most responsible for the crisis, the financial services industry, the Obama administration supported its core structure built on the laissez-faire era of the past two decades, accepting the largely unsubstantiated argument that financial innovation is a vital and necessary good for the economy.

With the government’s tacit support of the status quo, the investment mood shifted from fear and concern to hope and then enthusiasm.

The evidence of this mood shift back to the animal spirits days of yore came from a logical source – the financial services industry, the very sector of the global economy that provided the financial innovation grease to the out of control freight train of credit. And what better symbolic locomotive than Goldman Sachs, whose earnings report of July 14th whistled the bad old days were back in action. At this point, the Obama administration swung into action – with silence.

With its absence of outrage, the increasingly politically tone deaf Obama administration sent the public policy signal that its okay to bring the world economy to its knees, its okay to get bailed out with taxpayer money, its okay to shrink the competitive landscape (via Bear and Lehman’s demise), and its okay to return to the way things were – big profits and in your face fat bonuses.

The product of this wink and nod to Wall Street was the backlash at town hall meetings, which were as much about fairness as they were about healthcare reform concerns, a paranoid view of government, and a reactionary view of what constitutes being an American. It also produced an enthusiasm for stocks and an implied return to the bad old days.

Investment Strategy Implications

When you combine all these factors with the massive amount of investment capital ($3.5 trillion) still sitting in the near zero interest rate money market sidelines, the rising belief among many institutional investors that P/Es above their historical average are justified in the current low inflation environment, and the fledgling confidence that the global economy is on the mend* (along with the blind faith that the economic data from China is real), it is understandable how valuation levels could get to where they are today – stretched.

The investment question then becomes, “Is this a solid enough foundation upon which sustainable bull markets are built?” I have my doubts.

*I suggest reading Nouriel Roubini's comments in yesterday's FT.

In Defense of Financial Innovation

There is considerable talk (much of it rather regressive) about the future of the financial system. In one camp are the advocates of a return to basic banking. Think George Bailey and “It’s a Wonderful Life”. Paul Krugman, John Bogle, and Meredith Whitney appear to belong to this group. Then there are those who believe that the system should evolve from where it was, only with better oversight and far greater transparency. By all accounts, Secretary Geithner and Mohammed El-Erian belong to this group.

As unpopular as it currently may be, I’m on the side of the Treasury Secretary and PIMCO CEO for the following reasons:

I believe financial innovation must be allowed to grow and even flourish as the benefits of risk management and opportunistic investing through derivatives, structured finance, and other heretofore unknown instruments is vital to the complex world of globalization and global capital flows. Financial innovation allows for the more efficient use of capital in new and innovative ways thereby enabling greater growth potential across most markets and economies. Perhaps most importantly, as providers of global capital, financial innovation is important to the dominant players in the markets - major institutional investors (pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowments, hedge funds, etc) - and their ability to manage large sums of money in the vast and growing global markets and economy. They want it. Even need it.

The George Bailey model is simplification for its own sake. A Luddite-like natural recoil action to the pain and suffering caused by the failure of proper oversight and transparency. Moreover, the Bailey model would relegate the US financial institutions to a dumbed-down version of finance completely at odds with a globalized world and economic system (not to mention the unintended consequences of assets flowing to other, more forward-thinking markets). I believe Secretary Geithner sees and understands this and that is why, much to the consternation of many old school thinkers, he is intent on keeping the current financial infrastructure in place, just fix that which went out of control courtesy limited oversight and inadequate transparency.

With better oversight and greater transparency, the benefits of financial innovation to the global economic system far outweigh the damage wrought by the inept supervision of a complex world of finance and capital flows.

Think of it this way, did FDR blow up the stock market after the 1929 to 32 crash? What he did was create the SEC, which served the system well until the free market ideologues got control of it over the past several decades and, with the aid of financial innovation, allowed the animal spirits to run roughshod over common sense and prudent asset management. Another example would be the Internet and the tech bubble blow up. Did technology innovation stop because of Enron and WorldCom and the multitudes of dotcom implosions? Of course not.

Financial innovation is a tool. And like any tool, it can be used for good or ill. You don't ban knives because someone gets stabbed. You don't ban guns because someone gets shot. And you don't ban cars because someone gets run over. Innovation is essential for forward progress. And, in the case of finance, an enabler of better asset and risk management.

Financial innovation is the baby. Don't throw him out with the bath water of poor oversight and limited transparency.

Looking Beyond the Panic

Warren Buffett may have been way too premature when he declared in May of this year that the panic phase of the credit crisis was over. Recent developments suggest, however, that there are good reasons to conclude that Mr. Buffett's prediction is close at hand. Evidence for this thinking can be found in two items posted in today’s media.

The first is the Financial Times commentary by George Soros (“Recapitalise the banking system”*), which is a must read for all investors interested in understanding key aspects of the next steps in the credit crisis. The second is the simply awful results of the latest ISM manufacturing report.

With the near certain passage of the sweetened Senate bill, the Soros commentary may strike some as moot, for the Soros prescription will never go beyond the eyeballs of its readers. Such thinking, however, would miss the nuggets of insight embedded in his views. Of special note is how mark-to-market for illiquid assets will die its deserved death. For example, Soros’ recommendation “could require the Treasury to provide cheap financing for mortgage securities whose terms have been renegotiated based on the Treasury’s cost of borrowing. Mortgage service companies…could expect the owners of the securities to provide incentives for renegotiation as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are already doing.” In other words, valuation will be (and in fact is being) determined not on the capital requirements of impaired banks but on the US government. This is, in effect, the same valuation result that will occur under the Paulson plan (see section 132 of the House bill) and the announcement of the SEC and FASB made yesterday re fair value and FAS 157. Bye bye, fair value. Hello, common sense.

On the assumption of passage of the Senate bill by the adults in Congress, the pressure on the House will be enormous, made all the more difficult to resist considering the extension of the business tax breaks (in the Senate bill) and today’s dire ISM manufacturing report. The business oriented realists in the House will hopefully make the connection.

Investment Strategy Implications

The financial markets are not out of the woods. But with the full faith and credit (and the attention) of the US government now fully engaged, it does seem fair to conclude that Warren Buffett’s premature prediction will now come to pass. If so, then it’s time to look past the panic and examine the economic debris that the unnecessarily disorderly deleveraging process has wrought. In that regard, it can be assumed that overall operating earnings will decline moderately thanks to improving financial earnings (write ups!) offset by a substantial decline in the more cyclical sensitive sectors (consumer balance sheet repair via deleveraging). In the process, P/E ratios will likely continue their descent below their long-term average of 15x, but not into the deep recession zone of 8 to 12x. The near term effect should be a sense of relief for investors as the panic triggered by the credit crisis slowly recedes.

(Oh, did I mention the fact that the fourth quarter tends to be a very good one for stocks?)

*To read the Soros commentary (subscription required), click here

What’s In A Name?

A bailout by any other name would smell just a foul. Or would it?

The Bard may have captured the essence (pun intended) of the smell test, but then again he didn’t run for elected office. Nor did he live in a media saturated, image drenched world as we do. Therefore, when Bush left it up to the political tone deaf Treasury Secretary and Fed Chairman to be the messengers of the plan to rescue the US and world economy, he violated the primary rule of any political action – control the message. And controlling the message means framing the issue properly with a title that captures the essence of the desired action and one that will help win the hearts and minds of voters and their representatives. After all, who is in favor of a bailout of any sort? Least of all one for the “New York City fatcats (who) expect Joe Sixpack to buck up and pay for all of this nonsense*”?

To some, what you call something may appear to be trivial. However, behavioral scientists (and common sense) will tell you that many decisions made in life (including investing matters) are not done in a dispassionate, rational manner but by using mental shorthand tools (heuristics). And part and parcel of that process is how you frame the issue (framing). Therefore, if you let something get framed as a “bailout”, that’s what it will be perceived as.

So, as many members of the House rethink their profiles in cowardice by putting re-election before country, perhaps the administration and congressional leaders might consider a better process of explaining more clearly to the American public and their highly re-election conscious representatives what it is at stake.

The “Rescue America from a Depression” bill may not be the best smelling sausage to come out of Washington, but the stench of a deep recession will smell a heck of lot worse.

*Rep. Ted Poe (R), Texas

Cutting Off Your Nose to Spite Your Face

As of this moment (2:50 PM eastern) the House of Representatives has dealt a huge blow toward stabilizing the financial markets and avoiding a world economic crisis. The less than perfect Paulson bill would have accomplished that goal in numerous ways. One of them, which has been least understood and grossly underappreciated by most other than those who read this blog, is the method by which the Treasury and the Fed would have finessed the rules and stopped the gasoline that turned a house fire into an inferno – FAS 157.

The Paulson plan’s tourniquet that would have stopped the writedown bleeding is mark-to-maturity, the plan’s component that would have enabled Treasury and the Fed to finesse the insanity of FAS 157’s mark-to-market and ceased the graveyard spiral of lower values, more capital, forced sales, lower value, etc.

What Now?

There is still time for the House to come to its senses and immediately pass a bill that would be far better than the alternative of no bill. On the assumption that such an action did not occur, however, then financial assets and therefrom the world economy will suffer the consequences the likes of which are extreme in the best case.

Yet, there is an alternative, an action that could help alleviate the carnage, one that comes from the source of the carnage – FASB. A repeal or more likely a suspension of FAS 157 would go miles toward accomplishing what the Paulson plan would have achieved – stopping the graveyard spiral in asset values.

As for the odds of that happening, the answer is simply “who knows?” However, the consequences of no action by either the House or FASB are frankly unthinkable. Let’s pray for less principled outrage and more adult, common sense decision-making.

Unacceptable

As the world listens to Messrs. Paulson and Bernanke argue for support of their three-page $700 billion manifesto, I wish to focus your attention on a central aspect of the credit crisis – the scale and scope of the credit derivatives octopus.

To illustrate, consider this: If scientists can “identify all the approximately 20,000-25,000 genes in human DNA”, and “determine the sequences of the 3 billion chemical base pairs that make up human DNA,” then why can’t the financial scientists identify the extent of the credit derivatives market?

This is a national, if not global, emergency. In such an emergency, is it acceptable to say, “We don’t know what we don’t know?” Or, “It’s too hard to figure out.” Nonsense. If this emergency were a war, would it be acceptable to say, “We can’t build that tank or missile because we don’t know where the steel is”? Of course not. So, why is it acceptable to say we don’t know the extent of the credit derivatives octopus?

Perhaps certain US government officials do know but they are just not saying so. Perhaps those certain US government officials reside in the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Bank. If so, then their actions these past anxiety-riddled months are about as inept as could be possible as a more comprehensive plan of action should have been constructed (from such knowledge) rather than the firemen Hank and Ben put out the latest financial wildfire this weekend, right now routine we have been treated to.

Investment Strategy Implications

Along with the insane decisions to implement FAS 157 and eliminate the uptick rule, the outrageous neglect on the part of those charged with oversight of the entire financial services industry, and the fundamental rationale supporting each (efficient markets and laissez-faire), you can add the unacceptable argument that it’s just too hard to figure out the credit derivatives octopus.

In the process, the world’s markets and economies are now forced to experience a disorderly unwinding of the credit bubble – a disorderly unwinding that could have been mitigated had certain action steps, and the rationales supporting them, been avoided.

Sadly, today’s testimony will almost certainly contain a lot of shoulder shrugging “we don’t know what we don’t know, it’s too hard to figure out” statements. Unacceptable.

Minyanville: Understanding the Panic of 08

This week's Minyanville posting provides a concise review of how things got to where they are and how investors might go beyond their own fears and exploit the panic, including 2 buy recommendations in the infrastructure area.

"The Panic of '08 has nearly every investor convinced that the world is coming to an end. With the financial system shaken to its core, who can blame them? But is the world really coming to an end? Are the "evil doers" on Wall Street getting their just deserts while causing unbearable hurt for the rest of us? Is it time to repent, for the end is near?..."

To read my Minyanville articles including today's posting, click here

From Chaos to Sanity: The Imperative of Logic

Rules Matter.

If the NFL changes its rules of play, does that not have an effect on the game? So, why would a rule change by the FASB or the SEC or a law by Congress not have the same game changing effect?

When the FASB said that illiquid and opaque assets should be valued at their last sale (or whatever could be approximated as such), were they cognizant of the impact it would have on financial institutions with their capital requirements?

When the SEC eliminated the uptick rule and looked the other way on naked short selling, were they cognizant of the impact it would have in facilitating the bear raids from short sellers? And were they aware that such bear raids would virtually take off the table any capital raising options via an equity sale for financial stressed institutions?

When Congress let the financial innovation genie out of the bottle via various laws (mostly in the area of deregulation) and lax oversight, were they cognizant of the impact it would have on the financial engineers on Wall Street?

The answer to all of the above is apparently not.

Let me clear – the problems of excess amounts of leverage, animal spirits, and bad business decision-making are at the core of the credit crisis. There is no doubt that this is where the blame must lie. Be it no-doc, no-income mortgages, or homes purchased with the intent of flipping them in six months, or credit cards to teenagers in high school, or junk bonds with very generous covenants, the list is very, very long. However, the circumstances produced by such bad behavior are not the only culprits. For when coupled with virtually no oversight and the above noted rule, legislative, and regulatory changes, the bubbles that were blown are what the financial system is now struggling to unwind. Which brings us right to the single most important aspect of the crisis – will the unwinding of the excess amounts of leverage (the deleveraging process) be an orderly or disorderly one?

If left unchanged, the answer is what you see on your screens everyday. Firemen Hank and Ben rushing about to put out one financial wildfire after another.

But it need not be this way.

No doubt, there are many ways to achieve the same end result – a more orderly transition of the deleveraging process – but we’ve got to get beyond the reactive mode and become more proactive to begin to move from chaos to sanity. So, let me humbly offer a few immediate solutions to the credit crisis:

1 - Modify FAS 157

Change the rule from the insanely destructive and academically illogical mark-to-market to mark-to-moving average. By shifting the “fair value” reading from the last sale to the average of the past six months, you will get the closest thing to a reasonable compromise between the market fundamentalist ideologues (with their quaint notion that markets are always efficient) and the realists who know that in the short term investors can be anything but rational, especially when it involves illiquid, opaque assets.

2 – Require more transparency in illiquid assets

The FASB’s recent rule change for FAS 133 appears to be one such solid step in the right direction. More needs to be done.

3 – Begin the process of creating standards for derivatives

Financial innovation is not going away. And when conducting properly, financial innovation can be a very positive force for the real economy. However, when so much is constructed in the dark, in times of stress it becomes impossible to determine where the bodies are buried.

4 – Restore the uptick rule

Since the SEC has finally woken up and instituted sanity into the naked short selling arena, they now need to revisit their laissez-faire, market fundamentalist ideology and restore the uptick rule. By doing so, it will significantly reduce the incentive for the pre-Depression era bear raids that are wrecking such havoc.

5 – Move with a sense of urgency

I began this commentary with a reference to football, so let me return to that metaphor.

In a football game, there often comes a point where time is of the essence. And those teams that are prepared for such times act with clarity and a strong sense of urgency. They may not always succeed but the process is the correct one. The current crisis requires such a sense of urgency. If left unchecked, however, the bear forces at work will continue their bear raids (on equity and debt) until the threat to the system becomes more than it can withstand. Frankly, financial Armageddon is not too strong of a phrase.

Investment Strategy Implications

The impact on the economy has now become so significant that lives are being impacted, most dramatically within the companies that are being driven out of business or into the arms of the US Government and for why? Because rule changes have altered the game.

The laissez-faire, market fundamentalism Reagan doctrine is dead. Over. Finished. Kaput. In its place will be a return to the regulatory and oversight environment that preceded it. The danger is if the pendulum swings too far the other way and restrictions are imposed that severely limits the US’s ability to compete. Given the populist rant of the two presidential candidates, such a move to overregulation is not out of the question.

As I noted yesterday and Mr. El-Erian stated in his interview, transitions can be very messy. Let’s hope that some degree of clear thinking will produce the kind of results needed.